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ON CLIMACUS’S “AGAINST REASON” THESIS:  
A CHALLENGE TO WESTPHAL
Eleanor Helms
I object to Merold Westphal’s characterization in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith 
(2014) of faith as “against reason.” I argue that Kierkegaard scholars em-
phasize the tension between faith and reason more than Kierkegaard does, 
affirming and perpetuating a broader antagonism in our own cultural cli-
mate. I suggest that the view of faith as “transforming vision” developed by 
M. Jamie Ferreira and others makes better sense of the different facets of faith 
pointed out by Westphal and the strengths of his account (especially faith as a 
passion) while avoiding conceptual and practical problems with the account 
Westphal has recently offered.
Introduction
If we know anything about Kierkegaard, it is that for him faith is in some 
sense “against reason.” While most scholars do not consider Kierkegaard 
to be a fideist or irrationalist,1 there remains significant disagreement as 
to what exactly that means. Merold Westphal’s recent book Kierkegaard’s 
Concept of Faith offers a helpful overview of some of these disagreements, 
but in the end, I argue, comes down too strongly on the side of faith 
being “against reason.” I show more generally that Kierkegaard scholars 
emphasize the tension between “faith and reason” more than Kierkeg-
aard does, and I suggest moreover that this undue emphasis has the 
unfortunate result of affirming and perpetuating a broader antagonism 
between Christianity and academia in our own cultural climate. Framing 
Kierkegaard’s concept of faith as “against reason” both misrepresents 
Kierkegaard and offers the wrong kind of guidance in our current social 
context. I propose that the view of faith as “transforming vision” devel-
oped by Jamie Ferreira, Rick Furtak, Patrick Stokes, and others (or what I 
will call the “Vision Model”), makes sense of the different facets of faith 
pointed out by Westphal and the strengths of his account (especially faith 
as a passion) while avoiding both the interpretive and practical problems 
with Westphal’s recent account.
1See for example the collection of essays in Kierkegaard after MacIntyre, especially Daven-
port, “The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice,” 75–112.
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Reason and Understanding in  
Kierkegaard Scholarship and Early Translations
In Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, Westphal offers twelve different aspects 
or characteristics of faith. This multifaceted approach enables Westphal 
to follow different themes through Kierkegaard’s work. He also recog-
nizes the importance of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, associating each 
aspect with one primary pseudonym (Johannes de Silentio, Johannes 
Climacus, or Anti-Climacus). Through these different discussions, one 
theme to which Westphal returns at several points is the relationship be-
tween faith and reason and the extent to which they are opposed or can 
be reconciled.
I take Westphal’s view to be that faith and reason are not essentially op-
posed; however, his claims are ambiguous in several ways. Westphal first 
attributes an “‘against reason’ thesis” to Climacus before going on to offer 
nuance as to what such a thesis could mean.2 He plays up the thesis in sev-
eral ways, including in chapter titles: we consider faith as the “Teleological 
Suspension of Reason” in chapter 5 and as a “Striving Pathos That Goes 
against Reason” in chapter 11. At the same time, Westphal cautions that 
“we should not latch onto just any possible meaning of the phrase ‘against 
reason’ and attribute it to Climacus.”3 Westphal then goes on to say that 
Climacus is likely challenging the Platonic epistemology of recollection4 
as well as the Platonic ontology according to which time and eternity are 
logically exclusive,5 in contrast with Climacus’s claim that they are a syn-
thesis for the self. Christianity would be irrational according to such an 
ontology, but of course it is not the only possible or logically defensible 
one. (In fact, Hegel argues for such a synthesis.) Elsewhere, Climacus 
complains that “speculative philosophy” does not dispute Christianity 
but rather explains away its central paradox (i.e., eternity entering time).6
Perhaps surprisingly, however, Climacus does not use the phrase 
“against reason” at all, either in Philosophical Fragments or Concluding Un-
scientific Postscript, as I discuss further below.7 In mitigating the possible 
ways in which such a thesis might be misunderstood, Westphal is solving a 
problem he is at the same time helping to create—that is, the mistaken view 
that faith is obviously “against reason” for Climacus and all that remains 
for scholars to do is determine exactly what he means by this controversial 
claim. Where does the idea of an “against reason” thesis come from?
2Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 224.
3Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 224.
4Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 225.
5Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 226.
6Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 212, 214.
7All textual counts here are based on searching the digital texts supplied by the Soren 
Kierkegaard Center at http://teol.ku.dk/skc/english/. Many thanks for the many individuals 
at the SKC who have worked to make these online texts freely available.
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Climacus does use the phrase “against understanding [Forstand]” 
quite often, as I discuss below. As Westphal rightly observes, however, 
“understanding” and “reason” are distinct powers for Hegel,8 as they 
are for Kant. “Understanding” is the way in which minds conceptualize 
and give structure to the world as it appears; “reason” is more specula-
tive, going beyond what appears (at least for Kant) to ideas such as the 
self, God, and the universe, which can never appear in experience.9 For 
Hegel, reason is likewise holistic: the totality of being and becoming 
are united as Spirit and made explicit.10 For both philosophers, reason 
resolves dialectical tensions that arise at the level of understanding. For 
Kant, reason resolves the transcendental dialectic of the antinomies by 
recognizing that the universe is an idea of reason, not an object of pos-
sible experience (i.e., of understanding).11 For Hegel, contradictions at the 
level of perception and understanding are resolved in a higher synthesis 
of reason as self-consciousness and unity.12 While I do not propose that 
Kierkegaard agrees with Kant and Hegel on exactly these points, it would 
have been odd for Kierkegaard to expect people familiar with Kant and 
Hegel to hear the phrase “against understanding” as a critique of reason 
in the transcendental (and quite technical) Kantian and Hegelian sense. 
While Kierkegaard may not be maintaining the same technical distinction 
(perhaps using “understanding” more loosely to mean “common sense 
understanding”), it is odd to then also treat the generic phrasing as inclu-
sive of specific transcendental accounts, in which reason is very unlike our 
“common sense understanding.”13 Yet Westphal insists that Kierkegaard 
includes all these types of reason (put forward by Spinoza, Kant, and 
Hegel).14
So what exactly does Kierkegaard mean to include by the phrase 
“against understanding” when it appears in various works? This question 
arises already at the level of translation, and decisions by early transla-
tors may have influenced the perspective of contemporary commentators. 
Andrew Burgess has provided a valuable overview of correspondence 
between Walter Swenson and David Lowrie on their disagreement over 
the term Forstand. Lowrie, noting the Hegelian distinction above, preferred 
to translate Fornuft as “reason” (like the German Vernuft) and Forstand as 
8Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 132–133, 242.
9Kant, “Third Part,” Prolegomena, 65. 
10Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 482–483; para. 794. See also Westphal’s discussion of 
Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, at 132–133, especially 3:261.
11Kant, “Third Part,” Prolegomena, §§50, 74.
12“For knowing is itself the movement of these abstract moments, it is the universal self, 
the self of itself as well as of the object and, as universal, is the self-returning unity of this 
movement.” (Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, para. 583, 356)
13In fact, Kierkegaard sometimes uses it positively, for example when he writes that “to 
understand and to understand are two different things” (Concept of Anxiety, 142; cited in 
Gouwens, “Imagination in Repetition,” 287).
14Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 20–25.
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“understanding” (like the German Verstand).15 Swenson argued instead that 
dividing the terms risks communicating (mistakenly, Swenson thought) 
that some type of reason is not affected by the Absolute Paradox.16 Burgess 
sums up the disagreement well:
Lowrie prefers the term “understanding,” because that usage leaves room 
for someone to think there is another higher principle, the reason; while 
Swenson insists on the term “reason,” precisely in order to prevent anyone 
from thinking in this way.17
Part of Swenson’s argument is that there is no consistent distinction 
in everyday Danish between “reason” and “understanding,” just as there 
is none in English.18 Lowrie asks in reply: “Why is it that S. K. does not 
use the words interchangeably, but (in the contexts we are interested in) 
uses exclusively Forstand?”19 Burgess then observes that Swenson never 
replies directly to this question of why Kierkegaard so privileges just one 
term.20 How consistent is Kierkegaard on his use of these terms? The term 
Forstand appears 1,344 times in Kierkegaard’s published writings. Fornuft, 
by contrast, appears only 7 times.21 If this is simply a matter of equivalence 
and convenience (as it is more common in English to say “I understand 
X” than to say “I reason X”) then we should find the same relative pro-
portions in scholarship and commentaries. In fact, what we do find is an 
inversion, with scholars and commentators showing a marked prefer-
ence for “reason” and Fornuft over “understanding” and Forstand, even 
in commentaries on texts where these terms are not used at all, such as 
Philosophical Fragments and Sickness unto Death. In searchable Danish com-
mentaries at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center, the term Forstand 
appears 504 times (fewer times than Kierkegaard), while the term Fornuft 
appears 122 times (much more often than Kierkegaard). If the terms are 
equivalent within each language, why is Fornuft (reason) used dispropor-
tionately by scholars, in preference to the term Kierkegaard actually uses, 
which is almost always Forstand (understanding)?
As already suggested, English-speaking Kierkegaard scholars do this 
as well, though it is more difficult to document quantitatively. What we 
do readily find are examples of commentators glossing a quote in which 
Kierkegaard uses the term “understanding” as a broad stroke against 
15Andrew Burgess, “Forstand,” 112, citing Walter Lowrie, correspondence, Univ. of Minn. 
#33, Princeton #30.
16Burgess, “Forstand,” 113, citing Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, 219–220.
17Burgess, “Forstand,” 113.
18Burgess, “Forstand,” 113, citing Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, 218–219.
19Burgess, “Forstand,” 114, Walter Lowrie, Swenson-Lowrie correspondence, Univ. of 
Minn. #45, Princeton #41.
20Burgess, “Forstand,” 115.
21Forstand appears an additional 1,259 times in unpublished writings, including journals, 
papers, and letters. Fornuft appears an additional 48 times in other writings.
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reason in general.22 C. Stephen Evans, who has knowledge of the Swenson-
Lowrie debate and history, explicitly does so to make an interpretive point 
(that is, to show his support for Swenson’s decision). Here the transla-
tion preference is not merely a point of linguistic usage (e.g., that there 
is no difference in spoken Danish usage between the terms) but explicitly 
a philosophical one. That is, his use of the term is an expression of his 
agreement with Swenson that Kierkegaard’s critiques apply to all types of 
reasoning, as he explains in a footnote in Passionate Reason.23 Such decisions 
by established scholars have meant, unfortunately, that readers of the early 
Swenson-Lowrie translation of Philosophical Fragments as well as readers of 
contemporary secondary sources in English will come away with the idea 
that Kierkegaard frequently uses both terms and varies their context. Be-
yond foiling the basic goal of textual accuracy, conflating and even inverting 
the terms has two more significant consequences I will develop here. First, 
it undermines the claim, accepted by many scholars (including Westphal, 
I believe), that faith and reason are not essentially opposed. Regularly 
referring to “reason” rather than “understanding” in contexts in which 
Kierkegaard emphasizes some kind of opposition with faith will make 
the kinds of reconciliations and refutations of irrationalism, even those 
proposed by commentators like Westphal, difficult to fill out consistently 
(as I discuss further below). Second, changing Kierkegaard’s terminology 
makes it harder to (re-)introduce the technical Kantian-Idealist notion of 
transcendental reason into our contemporary conversations about faith, 
even though it is needed for reasons I will elaborate below. In my discus-
sion, I will focus my discussion on Westphal’s book Kierkegaard’s Concept of 
22In Karen Carr’s conclusion to “The Offense of Reason,” for example, she ends by treating 
“reason” as synonymous with logical inference (249) and with a quote on “crucifixion of the 
understanding” (quoting Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 559). See Carr, “The Offense of 
Reason” and Carr, “After Paganism”; see also Buben, “Neither Irrationalist nor Apologist,” 
319. Buben uncritically adopts language from Evans, citing passages on “understanding” in 
support of Evans’s broader claim about “reason,” even though Buben ultimately objects to 
Evans’s conclusion. Moreover, both “reason” and “understanding” are regularly reduced 
to the concrete situation of “having reasons or evidence,” so that the issue becomes the 
question of the role of apologetics (cf. Evans, Passionate Reason, 164-65, and Buben, “Neither 
Irrationalist nor Apologist,” 321, 324). For an in-depth discussion of his view on the rela-
tionship between faith and reason (and a defense of “against reason” language), see Evans, 
Faith Beyond Reason, 93–113. He concludes that reason is essentially concrete (a set of norms 
for reasoning that are socially acceptable) (94–96), which is of course quite different from 
the Kantian transcendental view. In fact, Evans explicitly argues that Kierkegaard can reject 
“concrete reason” without challenging “ideal reason” (94), which seems to me very much in 
line with the Kantian view properly understood.
23Evans agrees with Swenson that the Kantian-Hegelian distinction is not relevant. He 
argues that Philosophical Fragments as a whole “leaves no doubt that Climacus thinks that 
human beings are completely unable to comprehend the paradox of the incarnation. It was in 
fact to preclude this misinterpretation that David Swenson originally translated Forstanden 
as ‘the reason.’ To signify my own agreement with Swenson on this point, I shall talk in-
terchangeably about reason or understanding in discussing these issues” (Evans, Passionate 
Reason, 188n7). It is noteworthy here that, like Swenson, Evans makes his choice here in order 
to affirm a particular interpretation, without claiming that Kierkegaard himself uses them 
interchangeably.
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Faith, but I will also provide examples from other Kierkegaard scholars of 
the same kind of conflation and inversion of terms. I take Westphal’s usage 
to be a particularly clear and well-developed representation of a larger 
trend in Kierkegaard scholarship toward treating different kinds of cogni-
tive activities all under one generic name “reason.”24
Reason or Claims about Reason?
The central question is whether faith and reason are essentially (i.e., neces-
sarily) opposed, and if they are, what the “reason” that faith opposes is 
supposed to be. Westphal’s overall conclusion is that faith and reason are 
not essentially opposed. I take it that this is Westphal’s overall conclusion 
even though he at times directly states the opposite. For example, Westphal 
calls Socrates “an analog of the Christian faith that goes not merely beyond 
but against reason.”25 On the other hand, he also writes, “Abraham’s faith is 
unreasonable—madness, absurd, paradox—not intrinsically but relatively, 
that is, only in relation to some interpretation of reason or understanding 
from which some essential of biblical faith has been excluded a priori.”26 
Here Westphal treats the terms “reason” as equivalent to “understanding” 
as he does throughout Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (as well as to other 
terms such as “human wisdom”).27 The difficulties come when Westphal 
begins to spell out the way in which faith and reason are only relatively op-
posed, and to do so his definition of reason must evolve. Westphal initially 
defines reason as “the exercise of the human intellect unaided.”28 But this 
definition on its own says nothing about the intellect’s assessment of its 
own abilities (i.e., whether it recognizes any need for revelation or excludes 
biblical faith “a priori”). Introducing the claim that faith is “against” reason 
requires Westphal to supplement this initial definition: reason is not just 
human power unaided but “the human power to understand everything 
and leave no mysteries unresolved.”29 “Reason” now comes to mean not 
just an activity but a claim about the scope of that activity. Faith is not 
against reason or human power per se, he clarifies, but rather “particular, 
substantive, metaphysical” claims about what reason can accomplish (that 
is, its claim to be absolute).30 But this means that the “‘against reason’ 
thesis” is really an “‘against some claims about reason’ thesis.”
24Evans offers some clarifications in Faith Beyond Reason, 94, such as the distinction be-
tween “concrete” and “ideal” reason (see n. 22 above). But Evans goes on to make what 
would be category mistakes (from a Kantian-idealist perspective) by describing reason itself 
as selfish and prideful. From a Kantian point of view, this is like describing mathematics as 
prideful or sinful, whereas surely it is only persons (e.g., mathematicians) to whom moral 
qualifications can meaningfully be applied.
25Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 224 (emphasis mine); see also 199.
26Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 100.
27Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 225.
28Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 83.
29Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 86.
30Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 227.
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Further complicating the relationship between faith and reason, 
Westphal later adds an additional qualification: “If in faith one goes be-
yond these modes of reason, it will not be to abandon or abolish them but 
to suspend them teleologically in something taken to be higher and more 
inclusive.”31 To which definition of reason does teleological suspension 
apply? Surely unjustified claims about reason (e.g., its potential to leave 
“no mysteries unresolved”32) should be rejected once and for all, not just 
suspended. And human power unaided (the initial definition, without 
any claims about its scope) does not need to be “suspended” so much as 
appropriately restricted, again once and for all. So we actually need a third 
definition of reason to make sense of the claim of teleological suspension. 
It turns out that “reason” in this context actually means “the historically 
contingent perspective of a society,” i.e., “the ethical,” or Sittlichkeit.33 This 
(obviously quite different) third definition sits easily with the others only 
because it happens to converge with the second definition in the Enlight-
enment: the historically-contingent perspective of an Enlightenment-style 
society includes particular, substantive claims about the sufficiency of 
reason. By now we have gotten well beyond ordinary English or Danish 
uses of the term “reason” (or Fornuft), and likewise well beyond Swenson’s 
initial arguments to Lowrie for translating “understanding” as “reason.” 
Westphal instead now emphasizes Kierkegaard’s direct engagement with 
Hegel, where the term “reason” is invoked alongside other technical terms 
such as “speculation” and “system,” while at the same time being nev-
ertheless broad enough to include Kant and Spinoza as part of a generic 
“religion of reason.”34 Yet—like Swenson—while embracing the technical 
application to Hegel, Westphal resists aligning the terms with Hegel’s own 
(more limited) usage. Westphal—like Evans—insists that Kierkegaard’s 
critique is aimed at concrete or situated reason, and yet wants to draw a 
conclusion about transcendental reason as well.35
The term “reason” cannot mean all these things at the same time. It 
cannot at once be generic (all attempts to leave no mystery) and also 
technical (addressing Hegel’s transcendental system in particular), an 
epistemological error to be rejected and also restored through teleological 
suspension, absolute and also culturally situated. Most importantly, I see 
little justification for using a loaded, technical term like “reason” for this 
third sense, to mean something more like “being understood by one’s cul-
ture.” This third sense may often have little to do with logic or rational 
thought in a philosophical sense (much less reason in the transcendental 
sense used by Kant and Hegel). In the special case of the Enlightenment, as 
I have pointed out, two logically distinct things converge: (1) “reason” in 
31Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 227.
32Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 86.
33Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 169.
34Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 22, 132–133.
35See Evans, Faith Beyond Reason, 94, 96.
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its transcendental sense and (2) “reason” as historically-conditioned social 
or cultural expectation. In the Enlightenment—and in Kierkegaard’s Den-
mark—the historical time period (cultural expectation) just so happened 
to care a lot about transcendental reason and made bold claims about 
what it could accomplish. Westphal’s insistence that all of these are simply 
“reason” conflates these important distinctions.
We’re indebted to Westphal for putting forward the idea of historical or 
situated reason at all. Westphal has argued that when Silentio in Fear and 
Trembling talks about a teleological suspension of “the ethical,” he does 
not mean a suspension of moral goodness but something more like social 
context. On the other hand, if the “reason” that is teleologically suspended 
in faith does mean something more like Sittlichkeit, or common social un-
derstanding, there is no need to also reject (or even suspend) reason in its 
transcendental sense. Westphal nevertheless at times plays up a conflict 
between faith and reason in general without adding such qualifications. 
It would help avoid even initial confusions, for example, to replace the 
chapter title “Faith as a Striving Pathos That Goes against Reason” (chapter 
11) with “Faith as a Striving Pathos That Goes against Social Norms,” 
and “Faith as the Teleological Suspension of Reason” (chapter 5) with 
“Faith as the Teleological Suspension of Culture.” Doing so would affirm 
the conflict between faith and reason as historically contingent (cultural 
reason) rather than necessary (transcendental reason), if this is Westphal’s 
ultimate conclusion. Even the phrase “against understanding” feels less 
loaded, more inclusive of Westphal’s actual conclusions and of the focus 
of Fear and Trembling, which is Abraham’s inability to give an account of 
himself to others. Since “understanding” [Forstand] is a term that does ap-
pear in Fear and Trembling and the Postscript, and points more clearly to 
problems of communication and cultural acceptance (not logic),36 why not 
use it consistently—even exclusively—in commentaries on these works?37
Here Swenson’s other philosophical and theological reasons emerge as 
bearing all the remaining weight: even if Kierkegaard is himself ambiguous 
or prefers “understanding,” choosing to translate Forstand as “reason” al-
lows the translator to reinforce a particular, substantive claim: no part of 
human thinking is untouched by the paradox. Using the term “reason” 
also allows Westphal to emphasize the ways in which Kierkegaard chal-
lenges Enlightenment-style thinking broadly understood: Hegel, Kant, 
Plato, and even Aquinas, as well as contemporary views. (Westphal 
mentions positivism and the dominance of natural science.38) But this is 
again an attempt to have two contradictory things. Either Kierkegaard 
is criticizing contingent social norms about transcendental reason that 
turn out to be wrong, or the paradox (and faith) are contrary to reason 
36See especially Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 565.
37By contrast, Westphal proposes “Faith is incommensurable with reason” as one of Ki-
erkegaard’s “theses” (Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 61).
38Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 225.
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in its transcendental sense. Philosophers have made a variety of claims 
about transcendental reason, as Westphal notes.39 And it may well be that 
Kierkegaard disagrees with all of them—Aquinas through Hegel—on 
the relationship of faith to reason. Even so, Kierkegaard joins this debate 
as a philosopher—in fact retrieving Kant’s reservations, contra Hegel, 
about the sense in which to know a boundary is already to transcend it, 
as Westphal himself has argued.40 If so, these are “claims about reason1” 
vs. “claims about reason2”—two varieties of historical (cultural) reason—
not “reason (in general) vs. faith.” Westphal points out such differences 
among Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel but takes Kierkegaard to be somehow 
above the fray.41
Is there any sense in which a conflict between faith and reason is strictly 
necessary (i.e., logically essential), according to Westphal? Is there a way, 
in other words, in which faith and transcendental reason conflict? Westphal 
includes a quote from Evans that apparently embraces the ambiguity:
Insofar as God transcends the social order, and insofar as the social order at-
tempts to deify itself and usurp divine authority, there is a necessary opposi-
tion between faith and “reason,” just as there is a tension between faith and 
what in Fear and Trembling is called “the ethical.”42
Evans could mean that, since the social order does necessarily deify itself, 
there is a necessary tension between it and reason. Or, he could mean the 
exact opposite: faith and reason are not necessarily in tension, but only in-
sofar as the social order attempts to deify itself, which it does not inherently 
do but—as it turns out—often does.
Here again, much of the problem—the need to find just the right thing 
to say about reason—is self-inflicted. In the passage just quoted, “reason” 
and “the ethical” are in quotation marks, presumably because they do not 
refer to reason or ethics in a strict sense but rather to some historical (cul-
tural) claims about reason. But it becomes easy to now treat these terms 
(and the connection between them) as if they belong to Silentio. On the 
above passage from Evans, for example, Westphal writes: “Silentio insists 
that, while the knight of faith has gone beyond ‘reason’ and ‘the ethical,’ 
he does so only ‘after’ having been immersed in them and without aban-
doning them.”43 Saying that “Silentio insists” any of this is misleading: the 
analogy between reason and the ethical is made by Evans, not Silentio. 
Like Climacus, Silentio never uses the term “reason” [Fornuft] at all.44 Here 
39Westphal proposes reasons, reasonk, and reasonh to describe the different views of 
reason in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel (Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 21).
40See Westphal, “In Defense of the Thing in Itself,” esp. 134–141.
41Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 21.
42Evans, “Faith as the Telos of Morality,” 24, quoted in Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of 
Faith, 100 (emphasis mine.)
43Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 101.
44Similarly, Westphal writes: “Silentio does make explicit that this does not invalidate 
the ethical universal but only relativizes it, and that for faith it is the relation to God that 
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again, Westphal and Evans first do significant work to exaggerate the ten-
sion before adding nuance, while nevertheless trying to have it both ways 
when a decision is clearly called for: Is the “reason” Silentio is concerned 
with here a contingent, Enlightenment claim we can discard (and/or te-
leologically suspend), or is it an essential feature of how human thinking 
(necessarily) works, i.e., something transcendental we cannot logically (or 
teleologically) abandon?
I will not argue here for either of these theses. My wider observation—
and I think the culturally more important one—is that we as scholars 
place undue emphasis on Kierkegaard’s challenges to reason while in the 
end offering little concrete insight into exactly how far such challenges 
extend. We will make more progress, I suggest, if we discard the pre-
sumption of an opposition between faith and reason. This presumption is 
both cultural, as I will show below, and philosophical, in the sense that it 
has become traditional to frame reason as autonomous and revelation as 
a source of alterity (a dichotomy which would have been nonsensical to 
earlier philosophers like Augustine and Aquinas). One strain in Kierkeg-
aard scholarship that does not force this opposition is the view of faith as 
transfiguring vision, or what I will call the “Vision Model,” as put forward 
by Jamie Ferreira and others. In the last section, I will examine the cases 
in which Kierkegaard does use the term Fornuft (“reason”) and argue that 
the Vision Model makes better sense of these examples in context.
Vision and Fornuft
What about the times Kierkegaard does discuss “reason” [Fornuft] itself? 
There are so few instances it is easy to address them individually. They 
do not suggest any kind of “against reason” thesis or even a sustained 
critique of reason. A few of them do suggest, however, an emphasis on 
new ways of seeing, as I will elaborate.
Several uses of the term Fornuft come in the course of general summary 
or paraphrase of someone else’s view. For example, in Johannes Climacus, 
or de omnibus dubitandum est, Climacus writes: “Therefore, it is really 
interesting to see how Hegel wishes to formulate the transition from con-
sciousness to self-consciousness, from self-consciousness to reason. When 
the transition consists merely of a heading, it is easy enough.”45 Again dis-
cussing other thinkers, Vigilius Haufniensis writes in Concept of Anxiety: 
“Usually immediacy is posited in opposition to reflection (inwardness) 
and then the synthesis (or substantiality, subjectivity, identity, that in 
governs our relation to society, whereas for reason, at least in its distinctive modern forms, it 
is the other way around” (Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 96), implying that Silentio 
“explicitly” says this about reason and its similarity to the ethical. These shortcuts become 
sedimented: in the index of Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, for example, one finds “as stock-
broker of the finite” under the heading “reason,” when in Fear and Trembling it is a reference 
to “the understanding” (91). The entry “Understanding” in the index to Kierkegaard’s Concept 
of Faith refers the reader to the entries for Hegel and defines “Understanding” as Vorstellung. 
Westphal also treats “reason” as equivalent to “human wisdom” more generally (225). 
45Philosophical Fragments IV B 10:12, n.d., 1842–1843; Johannes Climacus, 257–258 / SKS 15, 56.
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which this identity is said to consist: reason, idea, spirit).”46 In Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, the term appears as part of a humorous story. In 
the same spirit, Climacus adds the story of “Hilarius, Executioner,” who 
has lost his son, and says, “Take heart, reason, he lives!” as if “reason” (in 
general) needs comfort.”47
Of the four remaining uses of the term “reason” [Fornuft], two are quali-
fied by “human.” In Works of Love Kierkegaard writes:
When Christianity came into the world, it did not itself need to point out 
(even though it did so) that it was contending with human reason, because 
the world discovered this easily enough. But now, now when Christianity 
for centuries has lived in protracted association with human reason, now 
when a fallen Christianity (just like those fallen angels who married mor-
tal women) has married human reason, now when Christianity and reason 
have a Du relationship—now Christianity must above all itself pay attention 
to the obstacle.48
In Practice in Christianity, Anti-Climacus writes: “But what is the offense, 
that which offends? That which conflicts with all (human) reason.”49 But 
this usage no more justifies an “‘against reason’ thesis” than Anti-Climacus’s 
claim that “human compassion is a miserable invention that is cruel where 
the greatest need is to be compassionate and is compassionate only where 
in the truest sense it is not compassion!”50 constitutes an “‘against compas-
sion’ thesis.”51 Just as “human compassion” is not true compassion, “human 
reason” is not true reason.52
In one of the remaining examples, from Stages on Life’s Way, “reason” 
seems to be used in the sense of reflection (of the kind criticized in Two 
Ages):
Wenn in kleinen Städten ein Selbstmord vorfällt, wie lange wird nicht darüber 
gesprochen, wie viel wird nicht darüber vernüftelt [When a suicide occurs in 
small towns, how long one talks on and on about it, how much one reasons 
and palavers]! (However, I believe that one is through with it more quickly 
than if one were to introduce reason into this wisdom. Poor Paris!)53
46Concept of Anxiety, 142; IV 408 / SKS 4, 442.
47Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 514n / SKS 7, 466.
48Works of Love, 199 / SKS 9, 189.
49Practice in Christianity, 26; XII 25 / SKS 12, 40–41.
50Practice in Christianity, 17.
51“But it must be remembered that with regard to differences in life everyone wants to 
cling to his own; it is because of this fixed point, this consideration, that human compassion 
is always merely to a certain degree. Sausage peddlers will consider that in being compas-
sionate it is descending too far down to go to paupers in the poorhouse and express equality 
with them; the compassion of sausage peddlers is trapped in one consideration [Hensyn], 
consideration for other sausage peddlers and then for saloon keepers. Thus this compassion 
is not totally reckless [hensynløs]” (Practice in Christianity, 59).
52Westphal emphasizes the importance of the qualifier “human” for “human reason” in 
the opening of Kant’s First Critique (Westphal, “In Defense of the Thing in Itself,” 118, 136).
53Stages on Life’s Way, “Letters to the Reader,” §6, 480n / SKS 6, 44.
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But here there is no indication that Kierkegaard (or the pseudonym, 
Hilarius Bookbinder) intends a far-reaching critique of reason in general 
rather than simple over-reflection or calculation. It is clear in context, 
moreover, that the term “wisdom” is being used sarcastically.
The last example, from “The Tax Collector,” in fact more directly sup-
ports the Vision Model—namely, faith as a kind of sight, a transforming 
vision, as developed by Ferreira.
He cast his eyes down, but the downcast gaze sees God, and the downcast 
gaze is the uplifting of the heart. Indeed, no gaze is as sharp-sighted as that 
of faith, and yet faith, humanly speaking, is blind; reason, understanding, is, 
humanly speaking, sighted, but faith is against the understanding.54
While faith and reason are indeed opposed in this passage (and reason is, 
moreover, treated as equivalent to understanding), they are also presented 
as different kinds of activities or a turning of attention in different direc-
tions. Significantly, both reason and faith are described as a kind of sight. In 
another passage as well, cited by Westphal in support of a tension between 
faith and reason, it is actually a new kind of sight that is being emphasized. 
For example, framing a quote from “A Sermon” by Kierkegaard,55 Westphal 
says the following: “Where ‘reason’ claims autonomy and self-sufficiency 
for itself, it will find divine revelation to be ‘unreasonable’.”56 Like the pas-
sage in Without Authority, this discussion is actually about vision:
The glory of which we are speaking was certainly not very acceptable to the 
earthly eye, since it was a stumbling-block to the Jews and foolishness to the 
Greeks. The eye which saw it, therefore, was not the earthly eye, but the eye 
of faith, which confidently peered through the terror in order to see what no 
earthly eye can discover if he who gazes is ignorant of what there is to see.57
The emphasis here is much more on recognition and anticipation rather 
than “reason” in any traditional philosophical (much less transcendental) 
sense.
Such passages more obviously support the Vision Model of faith as put 
forward by Jamie Ferreira, Rick Furtak, and Patrick Stokes. For Ferreira, 
the decision or appropriation of faith is best described as a paradigm shift, 
or what she calls “an imaginative transition which is a reorienting, trans-
forming shift in perspective.”58 Drawing on the writings of Henry David 
Thoreau, Rick Furtak adds that even ordinary visual perception is always a 
matter of appropriation and receptivity. According to Thoreau, the “objects 
which one person will see from a particular hilltop are just as different 
54“The Tax Collector,” Without Authority, 132 / SKS 11, 268).
55Collected in Johannes Climacus.
56Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 88.
57Johannes Climacus, 88. The “eye of faith” has been examined by Robert Wyllie as will 
combined with intellect rather than as a challenge to reason. See Wyllie, “Kierkegaard’s Eyes 
of Faith,” 545–564.
58Ferreira, Transforming Vision, 56.
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from those which another will see as the persons are different,” since things 
are concealed from us “not so much because they are out of the course of 
our visual ray as because we do not bring our minds and eyes to bear on 
them.”59 Patrick Stokes develops a concept of moral “interest” [inter-esse] 
based on implicit self-awareness that enables one to locate oneself as an 
individual in relation to the world as it is perceived.60 None of these ac-
counts pits reason or understanding against faith. They instead view faith 
as a mode of understanding reality and one’s place in it.
Faith and Reason in American Christendom
I agree with Westphal’s overall claim: Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Hegel and Lessing argued that religion could be replaced by rational edu-
cation and that reason is in some sense higher than faith, and Kierkegaard 
disagreed. Westphal (along with Evans and others) has brought subtle and 
illuminating attention to this difference over the course of many years. But 
Climacus’s critiques of Hegel and Lessing regarding understanding are very 
specific, targeting some aspects of some forms of German Idealism while 
accepting and presuming others (such as dialectic). These specialized cri-
tiques do not necessarily imply, in other words, that faith is against reason 
in general, or “the reflectively organized common sense of mankind,” as 
Swenson argues.61 The reverse is also true: revelation may challenge our 
common sense cultural understandings without challenging all types of 
transcendental reason. (Kierkegaard could challenge Hegel while agreeing 
with much of Kant, for example.) In this case, unfortunately, it also turns 
out that scholars who side with Swenson are quick to import a preoccupa-
tion of our own culture (let’s call it “American Christendom”), which is all 
too comfortable with a “faith vs. reason” paradigm. In the section below, 
I lay out some ways in which the “faith vs. reason” dichotomy plays out 
in our own cultural context and explain why American Christendom—
our Sittlichkeit—needs the Kantian transcendental view of reason as a 
corrective.
Alan Jacobs recently argued in Harper’s Magazine (September 2016) 
that Christian intellectuals have largely retreated from the public sphere. 
Whether or not we agree with his claim, it is hard to imagine such an essay 
being written in Kierkegaard’s time. Earlier in 2016, Nicholas Kristoff 
wrote in The New York Times about George Yancy, a sociologist who stated 
he faces more discrimination as an evangelical in academics than as a black 
man outside it.62 In this time of “fundamentalist extremism,” “intellectual 
elitism,” “science denial,” and “secular” more often than not prefacing 
59Thoreau, “Autumnal Tints,” 393, cited in Furtak, “Skepticism and Perceptual Faith,” 529.
60Stokes, “Kierkegaard’s Mirrors,” 89. See also Stokes, Kierkegaard’s Mirrors.
61Burgess, “Forstand,” 115, citing Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, 99–100.
62Cf. Kristoff, “A Confession of Liberal Intolerance.” About George Yancy, a sociologist 
who is both black and evangelical, he writes: “’Outside of academia I faced more problems 
as a black,’ he told me. ‘But inside academia I face more problems as a Christian, and it is 
not even close.’”
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“academy” in everyday conversation, we expect a daily showdown of reli-
gion against reason in the public sphere. A reader approaching Westphal’s 
book with these cultural prejudices—historically contingent, substantive 
beliefs about faith and reason—will too readily find confirmation that 
faith and reason are “ill wed,” as Westphal describes them.63
In Kierkegaard’s time, playing up the ways in which faith is “against 
understanding” was a corrective for an age influenced by Christian Hege-
lians. Our age is different. Anyone who has taught Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
“Existentialism is a Humanism” recently knows how students love Sartre 
with the deep love sophomores have for someone telling them what they 
already think. The essay affirms for them that (1) reason is limited, (2) 
nevertheless, decisive actions are required, and (3) such actions constitute 
our identities. Many college students—religious, atheistic, and (relative) 
bystanders—presume that faith is in conflict with reason (both logic and 
science), that life is about authentic, decisive, identity-constituting action in 
practical contexts, and at the same time that most human so-called knowl-
edge is perspectival, cultural, and ultimately pragmatic. Can it be that our 
culture at large, led by our college students, has absorbed Kierkegaard’s 
dialectical wisdom? I doubt it. But as a result of such cultural changes, 
the oppositional framework that Westphal, Evans, and others continue to 
reinforce fails to act as a cultural corrective—a voice from elsewhere—in 
the ways they hope.
Moreover, they have rejected in advance some of the philosophical 
resources that can play such a corrective role. For example, Westphal 
challenges the dominance of natural science.64 One effective way to do 
this in our time, contrary to Westphal’s emphasis, is by teaching and un-
derstanding Kant’s claims about the limits of objective knowledge and 
scientific observation. Religious students as well as atheists have all been 
told from their respective sub-cultures that religion and science are at 
odds. In the 2014 film God’s Not Dead, for example, heavily advertised by 
Christianbooks.com (whose tagline “Everything Christian for less!” cries 
desperately for Kierkegaard’s satirical touch), a Christian student enrolls 
in a philosophy class and is immediately asked to write “God is dead” 
on a sheet of paper and sign his name to it. The Christian student refuses 
(the only one in a class of about 85 to do so), sparking a class debate over 
the existence of God that lasts until the end of the film. The film closes 
with a scrolling list of real-life Academia vs. Christianity court cases. Stu-
dents raised in the Christendom of films like this one expect a showdown 
between reason and faith. Non-religious and atheistic students likewise 
expect “reason” (science, logic, and common sense) to present a unified 
front against “faith,” the stubborn outsider. They do not expect an intra-
mural debate about knowledge between reason and science. Playing faith 
against reason discourages us from examining philosophically (that is, 
63Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 133, 182.
64Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 225.
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intramurally) what reason is and from distinguishing between different 
types of reason, as well as its social standing in our culture. My concerns 
here are both conceptual and practical: I have a philosophical concern to 
preserve or restore the conceptual subtlety of nineteenth-century reason 
in its transcendental, Kantian sense, in contrast with pure logic, concep-
tual understanding, and scientific observation, as I have discussed above; I 
also have a practical, pastoral concern about encouraging the pre-existing 
tendency of American Christians to treat reason and its university guard-
ians with suspicion, as exemplified in the film.65 I find Kierkegaard to be 
quite subtle on this point, critiquing “calculation” and “probability” but 
accepting other more sophisticated kinds of knowledge (as developed by 
Ferreira, Furtak, and Stokes, for example). We can accept these insights 
without claiming that reason can substitute for or replace revelation and 
faith, but it is difficult to do so if we reduce rich philosophical discus-
sions of reason (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example) 
to mere common sense and cultural norms.
Lastly, playing faith against reason, including by drawing lines of 
demarcation to separate their domains, diminishes our ability to form 
any “concept” of faith, Kierkegaardian or otherwise, by emptying the 
proposed alternatives of meaningful content. On the “leap,” for example, 
Westphal writes: “Cognition provides no bridge; a decision to act is 
needed.”66 What does a “decision to act” mean? Is it the result of delibera-
tion? Westphal references Aristotle’s practical syllogism.67 But a practical 
syllogism is hardly beyond or against reason. All means-ends reasoning, 
for Aristotle as well as for Kant, entails a decision to act in reality and to 
treat reasons or facts, as Stokes puts it, as “claiming” us.68 How is faith 
different from Aristotelian or Kantian practical reason on Westphal’s 
view? Moreover, action in response to testimony and authority would be 
rational according to many philosophers.69 How is religious faith unique? 
Westphal claims that one insight Kierkegaard appreciates from Lessing is 
that even “cognitive” leaps cannot be made cognitively.70 Does it all come 
down to personal appropriation?71 If so, is such appropriation arbitrary, or 
is it based on something?
65God’s Not Dead 2 was released April 2016. In this sequel, a Christian high school teacher 
does battle with a school board for quoting Scripture in class. It finished 4th in its opening 
weekend.
66Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 198.
67Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 200.
68Stokes, Kierkegaard’s Mirrors, 11.
69See for example Audi, “Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge,” 507–531. See 
also articles in Episteme: A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology 7:1 (2010), especially 
essays by Saul Traiger (“Experience and Testimony in Hume’s Philosophy,” 42–57) and Fred 
Wilson (“Hume and the Role of Testimony in Knowledge,” 58–78). On authority, see Linda 
Zagzebski, “A Defense of Epistemic Authority,” 293–306.
70Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 198.
71Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 201.
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Ferreira’s Vision Model answers these questions by including decisive 
action as an essential component of faith without asking it to carry the 
burden of being faith. The model of “transforming vision” accounts for the 
cognitive and existential shifts in the same movement. Ferreira writes the 
following:
When what is seen is not a neutral possibility laid out before one, but a pos-
sibility recognized and appreciated as a “task,” the relation between imagi-
nation and choice can no longer be the simplistic one in which imagination 
first lays out options and then we shut our eyes and hold our breath and 
“will” one.72
A new “seeing-as,” for Ferreira, is often multi-leveled and complex, in-
voking the will at the same time as the perceptual recognition, but without 
faith simply being a response of the will.73 Westphal rightly emphasizes, 
for example, that “the joy of knowing that one is related to an eternal 
happiness is dialectically inseparable from the suffering entailed in that 
relation.”74 This is so because the peculiar kind of joy received in suf-
fering is joy in consciousness75—a new way of seeing one’s suffering. Yet 
here again, Westphal turns the suffering of guilt into a tension “between 
faith and reason or understanding.”76 This addendum is not required or 
implied in the context of Climacus’s discussion. It leads us to see ourselves 
as mainly engaged in an ongoing battle against the Enlightenment rather 
than—at least on this point—as joined in wonder with these thinkers 
(and Kierkegaard among them) at the paradoxicality of consciousness 
and the richness of its objects,77 with new and higher pleasures offered 
to the rare Christian trained in philosophy and German Idealism who, 
like Kierkegaard, understands just how deep all this can go. Falling back 
instead on the familiar “faith vs. reason” dichotomy serves mainly to con-
firm the direction our culture at large is heading on its own, without any 
help from Kierkegaard.
No model of faith is likely to be the whole story. Westphal rightly em-
phasizes that Kierkegaard employs multiple pseudonyms in part in order 
to let each voice be one-sided.78 Kierkegaard writes, “Nothing is easier 
for the one providing the corrective than to add the other side: but then 
it ceases to be precisely the corrective and itself becomes an established 
order.”79 At the same time, this means that readers of Kierkegaard should 
72Ferreira, “Imagination and the Despair of Sin,” 63. See also Furtak, “Skepticism and 
Perceptual Faith,” 555.
73On the ways in which Kierkegaard lends complexity to the question of whether faith is 
“voluntary,” see M. Jamie Ferreira, “Imagination and the Despair of Sin,” 16–34.
74Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 216.
75Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 216, and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 452.
76Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 220.
77Cf. Johannes Climacus, 145.
78Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 217.
79Point of View, 205.
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recognize, perhaps more than anyone else, that being a cultural corrective 
will not mean pushing in the same direction always and for all time. My 
hope is that we will not overlook resources in Kierkegaard’s thought that 
do not fit comfortably with the ways we have become used to thinking, 
including the familiar ways of classifying philosophers in our Western 
cultural heritage. For us, here and now, the Kantian and Hegelian distinc-
tions among different types of reason are so far from being the established 
order that they have now become a corrective.80
California Polytechnic State University
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